# Contested concept: moral status

_**What you are reading**: one contested-concept page in Deliberus's deliberation graph. Deliberus maps human reasoning — including claims that are contested, mistaken, or extreme — so that disagreement can be examined precisely. A claim's presence here is not an endorsement: the graph records that someone argued it, how it connects to other reasoning, and how far scrutiny has gotten. The metadata on this page describes the state of that scrutiny, not the truth of the claim._

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- **Contestedness**: criterion
- **Diagnosis**: The dispute is over what justifies moral standing. It is not over whether marginal humans have it. Each side treats its own grounding as the neutral baseline, so the argument from marginal cases only bites against criteria that exclude marginal humans.
- **Canonical**: `/concept/moral status` (data: `/concept/moral status.json`)

## Senses in use
- **Status grounded in a shared morally relevant capacity such as sentience, so that humans and animals with that capacity are treated alike** — used in 6 claim(s)
- **Status grounded in what is normal for one's species, or in the general possession of moral agency** — used in 5 claim(s)
- **Status grounded in having once developed rational agency, which is retained even if the capacity is later lost** — used in 4 claim(s)
- **Status grounded in simply being human, which is a valid criterion as good as any other** — used in 4 claim(s)
- **Status that follows the gradient between humans and animals given by evolution** — used in 3 claim(s)

## Claims using this term
- [[a being that has obtained moral agency by developing a rational capacity], from there on, has full moral agency even if this [rational] ca…](/claim/claim_118120b2f9e5.md) _(sense: Status grounded in having once developed rational agency, which is retained even if the capacity is later lost)_
- [If human infants, senile people, the comatose, and cognitively disabled people have direct moral status, non-human animals must have a simi…](/claim/claim_1dea838bf854.md) _(sense: Status grounded in a shared morally relevant capacity such as sentience, so that humans and animals with that capacity are treated alike)_
- [All human beings, but not only human beings, are capable of feeling pain.](/claim/claim_1ecb3d5de9b8.md) _(sense: Status grounded in a shared morally relevant capacity such as sentience, so that humans and animals with that capacity are treated alike)_
- [It makes sense to understand people as having rights so their [moral agency] is respected and may be protected.](/claim/claim_22464f69d4d2.md) _(sense: Status grounded in what is normal for one's species, or in the general possession of moral agency)_
- [Any such characteristic that is possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only by human beings.](/claim/claim_2e58e686b762.md) _(sense: Status grounded in a shared morally relevant capacity such as sentience, so that humans and animals with that capacity are treated alike)_
- [There is nothing wrong with granting rights to disabled humans while denying [rights] to animals.](/claim/claim_596d125483c2.md) _(sense: Status grounded in simply being human, which is a valid criterion as good as any other)_
- [It is perfectly valid to use humanity as a moral status.](/claim/claim_629bee3faa10.md) _(sense: Status grounded in simply being human, which is a valid criterion as good as any other)_
- [The theory of evolution implies that there is only a gradient between humans and other animals, and therefore marginal-case humans should b…](/claim/claim_6327d55d9903.md) _(sense: Status that follows the gradient between humans and animals given by evolution)_
- [There is no known morally relevant characteristic that [human infants, senile people, the comatose, and cognitively disabled people] have t…](/claim/claim_7619ab64d050.md) _(sense: Status grounded in a shared morally relevant capacity such as sentience, so that humans and animals with that capacity are treated alike)_
- [The moral status of an individual depends on what is normal for that individual's species.](/claim/claim_8434a9b18762.md) _(sense: Status grounded in what is normal for one's species, or in the general possession of moral agency)_
- [In general people possess [moral agency], whereas non-people don't.](/claim/claim_8497171fee2f.md) _(sense: Status grounded in what is normal for one's species, or in the general possession of moral agency)_
- [Members of species whose members are mostly not moral agents, such as non-human animals, do not have the same rights and protections as hum…](/claim/claim_8a311c7f0081.md) _(sense: Status grounded in what is normal for one's species, or in the general possession of moral agency)_
- [All human beings, but not only human beings, are capable of feeling pain; and while only human beings are capable of solving complex mathem…](/claim/claim_98326c1c77b8.md) _(sense: Status grounded in a shared morally relevant capacity such as sentience, so that humans and animals with that capacity are treated alike)_
- [For any criterion or set of criteria [for moral status] (either capacities, e.g. language, consciousness, the ability to have moral respons…](/claim/claim_a3fcd4ea630e.md) _(sense: Status grounded in a shared morally relevant capacity such as sentience, so that humans and animals with that capacity are treated alike)_
- [a being can obtain moral agency by developing a rational capacity](/claim/claim_a70aa16b9843.md) _(sense: Status grounded in having once developed rational agency, which is retained even if the capacity is later lost)_
- [a human being reduced to the mental level of a cow does have [rights]](/claim/claim_af1f11d1572c.md) _(sense: Status grounded in having once developed rational agency, which is retained even if the capacity is later lost)_
- [Therefore [given that there is only a gradient between humans and other animals], marginal-case humans [human infants, senile people, the c…](/claim/claim_b076942f1b0b.md) _(sense: Status that follows the gradient between humans and animals given by evolution)_
- [in the case of the cow-minded human [a human being reduced to the mental level of a cow], there's a blank spot where her moral agency is su…](/claim/claim_d7cdcd06d7e0.md) _(sense: Status grounded in having once developed rational agency, which is retained even if the capacity is later lost)_
- [The theory of evolution implies that there is only a gradient between humans and other animals.](/claim/claim_e435e28662ac.md) _(sense: Status that follows the gradient between humans and animals given by evolution)_
- [There is no reason why simply being human should not be sufficient for moral status.](/claim/claim_e668cd8db00f.md) _(sense: Status grounded in simply being human, which is a valid criterion as good as any other)_
- [Alternative traits proposed for moral status, such as rationality or consciousness, are just as questionable a criterion for moral status a…](/claim/claim_f237f9af80d5.md) _(sense: Status grounded in simply being human, which is a valid criterion as good as any other)_
- [If most of a species' members are moral agents then any member [of that species] has the same rights and protections as the species.](/claim/claim_f624bc2b4b73.md) _(sense: Status grounded in what is normal for one's species, or in the general possession of moral agency)_